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M. VUICICH I
Defendant/Respondent.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

RESPONDENT'S COUNTERCLAIM DOES NOT STATE A CLAIM
Although Respondent contends that its pleading did
"provide Appellant with fully adequate notice of the nature of
Respondent's claim (P.6), his counsel's brief quoted W. Prosser
to the effect that abuse of process is essentially its use "for
an end other than that which it was designed to accomplish"
(P.5),

it is to be noted that it was not alleged in Respondent's

pleading that her use of a trespass claim was for any purpose
other than that for which that action was designed.
It is significant also that Respondent totally ignored
the

one

Utah

case

which

bears

Crease v. Pleasant Grove City,

on

this

519 P.2d 888,

l

issue,

to

wit:

30 Utah 2d 451

( 1974).

is no doubt due to the fact that

This

emphasized

the

essence

of

the

cause

of

action

that case
as

being a

"perversion of the process to accomplish some improper purpose"
whereas

no

improper

purpose

or

perversion

was

alleged

in

Respondent's pleading here challenged.
As

for

the

dispute

in

authorities

the

as

to a

requirement of "without probable cause," Appellant respectfully
submits that on principle such a requirement should be adopted
by this Court as being the law in Utah to guard against the
prospect of

routine

assertions

of

such

a

claim

and

its

utilization to effect a switch from the American rule to the
English rule with respect to attorney's fees being awarded to
the prevailing party.

If

Appellant

it ought to be

submits

that

such

a

policy

is

one

to

be

adopted,

mandated

by the

legislature rather than the judicial branch of goverment.
POINT I I

THERE

WAS

INSUFFICIENT

EVIDENCE

OF

ANY

IMPROPER

PURPOSE ON THE PART OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT TO SUSTAIN A JUDGMENT
FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS.
Respondent's Brief concedes that there was no direct
evidence of any improper purpose.

It contends, however, that an

inference of an improper purpose could be drawn from the "weight
of the evidence" present at trial (P.10).
argument on two grounds:

Appellant faults such

(1) it expands the proper use of an

2

inference

far

beyond

its

proper

bounds.

An "inference"

is

defined in Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth Edition) as follows:
In the law of evidence, a truth or
proposition drawn for from another which is
supposed or admitted to be true. A process
of reasoning by which a fact or proposition
sought to be established is deduced as a
logical consequence from other facts or a
state of facts already proved or admitted.
rn this

case Respondent has

made

no

attempt

to

identify a

specific fact or even a set of facts from which an improper
purpose may be inferred.

Certainly, such purpose could not be

inferred from the facts set forth in Respondent's Brief on this
point.

No purpose--proper or

improper--could be inferred from

the testimony of Roy Wilkins set forth on page 7 which related
to oral consent or the efforts of Respondent and his agents to
restore the property to as good or better a condition after
heavy equipment had traversed it twice.
opinion of

two neighbors

Likewise,

with the

that no damage was done or what a

prospective buyer might do with the property.
In short, the Respondent is asking this Court to allow
the

jury

to

conjecture

and

to

speculate

plaintiff's purpose was proper or not.

as

to

whether

Utah's standard jury

instruction on this point which is number 2.3 reads as follows:
The party upon whom the burden of proof
rests must sustain it by a preponderance of
the evidence.
The law does not permit you
to base a verdict on speculation or
conjecture as to the cause of the
(collision) incident in question.
If the
evidence does not preponderate in favor of
the plaintiff (party) making the charge of
negligence, then (he) has failed to fulfill
(his) burden of proof and your finding must
3

be against that party on that issue.
In
other words, if after considering all of
the evidence, it should appear to you just
as probable that the (defendant) was not
negligent as that he was, or that his
negligence, if any, was not a proximate
cause of the (collision) incident as that
it was such a proximate cause, then a case
has not been established against him by a
preponderance of the evidence as the law
requires and he cannot be held liable.
Of

course

"improper

purpose"

would

have

to

be

substituted for "negligence" to make it applicable to this case,
but the principle is the same regardless of the type of cause of
action.
As for

(2), the claimed inference flies directly in

the face of Respondent's own testimony as to what motivated
plaintiff in bringing this action.

He testified she did it for

money and that, "I can't see any other reason"

(Tl35).

Although

the Respondent himself could not see any other motivation than
money,

his counsel now contends that Appellant's purpose was to

vex, harass or extort without any evidence whatsover that she
did any of those things or even threatened to do any of those
things.

Such objectives almost certainly would be evidenced by

such overt conduct as personal confrontations,

phone calls,

letters and contacts by third parties or at least some of such
activities.

Here absolutely zero.

Assuming arguendo that the

lawsuit itself and alone could be used for such purposes, the
record is devoid of such abuses as a threat to sue unless X
dollars is paid, abusive discovery to run up excessive legal
fees or perjury.
4

Is this Court's decision in Leigh Furniture and Carpet
v. Isom,

657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) dispositive or even

persuasive as applied to the instant case?

No.

In that case

this Court had before it a record in which the evidence was in
Here there

conflict.

is

no conflict in the evidence regarding

Appellant's purposes (there was sharp conflict as to consent,
but

that

went

to

the

trespass

testified she had sued for

claim

money,

only).

a proper

Both parties

purpose,

and

in

addition, Appellant said she sued to protect herself against
third party claims that might result from soil subsidence.
Finally, Respondent's Brief made no attempt to address
the issue as to whether an abuse of process judgment may stand
when the trial judge determined that an award of attorney's fee
pursuant to Section 78-27-56, U.C.A. 1953 (Supp. 1981) should
not be made.
a situation

Is not declining to award attorney's fees in such
tantamount

to the trial court drawing opposite

inferences to the jury (assuming arguendo that inferences may be
drawn

from

the

"weight

particular facts)?

of

the

evidence"

rather

than

from

If the judge drew the same inferences as the

jury, would he not be acting contrary to the legislative intent
that such fees should be awarded when the suit was without merit
JnJ not brought in good faith?

CONCLUSION
Respondent neither alleged nor proved (1) an absence
of probable cause,
support

the

(2) an improper purpose for the suit which

judgment

for

abuse
5

of

process

appealed

from.

Litigants should have the right to have their day in court, and
lose,

without having the loss in and of

itself

represent a

finding of bad faith or malice on the part of the loser for
having originally initiated the action.
reversed and the lower court

The judgment should be

ordered to enter judgment of "no

cause on action" upon the Counterclaim.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

7-h-. day

of June, 1984.

Robert B. Hansen
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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